When Syrian President Bashar al-Assad visited Beijing in late September 2023, his decision to leave his children in China for their education sparked considerable public interest in the country. Behind this symbolic move lay a stark reality: Assad’s Syria, battered by years of war, sanctions and economic collapse, had reached the limits of survival. As Assad engaged with Beijing, he was likely sharing the grim details of his country’s unravelling.
The Assad regime is viewed more favourably by the Chinese public than the rulers of Saudi Arabia or the Taliban in Afghanistan. While Assad’s harsh crackdown on opponents is comparable to that of Turkey, it is perceived as less brutal than the murder of Jamal Khashoggi. Syria’s treatment of women is also seen as comparable to social norms in China.
A decade of resilience ends in economic ruin
Assad came to power in 2000 with an economy as fragile as it is today, but without the shadow of foreign-backed insurgents or widespread terrorism. In his first decade, Syria’s GDP more than tripled to $68 billion, with per capita income reaching $2,971 – double that of 2000. (Source) But the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011 marked a seismic shift. Backed by Russia, Syria survived the regional upheaval, unlike Egypt, Tunisia and Libya.
But this survival came at a price. Terrorist groups, allegedly sponsored by foreign powers, poured into Syria from Iraq and Turkey. Under the guise of counter-terrorism operations, US forces seized and controlled vital oil-producing regions. A joint UN-Syrian report in 2022 estimated that the US had removed more than $100 billion worth of Syrian oil between 2011 and 2022, exacerbating the crisis. Meanwhile, Kurdish militias, backed by US forces, occupied fertile agricultural land. Years of drought, sanctions and trade blockades exacerbated Syria’s plight, leaving its economy in tatters. (Source)
Military fatigue and social collapse
By 2023, Syria’s GDP had plummeted to $10 billion, with tax revenues at a meagre $800 million. The collapse of the Assad regime came with shocking speed in November, unfolding over the course of just 11 days. Military cutbacks reduced key divisions to a fraction of their strength, leaving an army of just 80,000. Syria’s infrastructure was in tatters: 40% of medical facilities destroyed, millions of children out of school and an electricity grid covering less than 30% of the country. (Source)
Assad reportedly described Syria’s precarious position to Beijing in blunt terms: encircled by Turkey to the north, the US to the east and Israel to the south, with Kurdish forces dividing the country. While the civil war officially ended in 2020, anti-government factions remain entrenched and ready to resume conflict.
Limited strategic losses for China
From China’s perspective, Syria’s collapse poses minimal strategic risk. According to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, the country’s direct investment in Syria in 2022 amounted to just $13.24 million. Trade figures are similarly modest: in 2022, China exported $425 million worth of goods to Syria, while importing $2.24 million. Despite its limited economic stakes, Beijing gave Assad a warm welcome during his visit, signalling solidarity with the Syrian people in their time of need.
However, there were no indications of a deeper commitment. Two key factors shape Beijing’s stance:
- Lessons from US involvement
The US military entered Syria in 2014 and has since shown signs of strategic fatigue. The withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 underscored America’s waning appetite for prolonged conflict in the Middle East. More recently, Houthi attacks on US naval vessels in Yemen went unanswered, suggesting a diminished willingness to retaliate. Assad may have been emboldened by these shifts, but China recognises the limits of US involvement. - Dependence on Russian security guarantees
For Beijing, Russia remains a cornerstone of security in regions such as Syria. However, Moscow’s prolonged involvement in Ukraine has drained its resources and reduced its ability to prop up the Assad regime. Despite this, the Syrian military has failed to capitalise on US vulnerabilities, such as retaking oil fields or agricultural zones. China is likely to see continued support for Assad as a futile exercise.
Turkey’s potential quagmire
Beijing is well aware of Turkey’s “EU money for Syrian refugees” model. Since 2016, President Erdogan’s inner circle has reportedly secured €9 billion from the EU to support around three million Syrian refugees – equivalent to €3,000 per person. However, the European Court of Auditors (ECA) has been unable to track how these funds have been used, as Turkish government agencies have refused to provide the necessary financial details. (Source) Nevertheless, fomenting instability through a civil war in its immediate neighbourhood in order to continue receiving EU payments would be a risky gamble for Turkey. Such a strategy is like playing with fire – too dangerous for direct or indirect involvement, even from a distance.
Syria’s collapse could become a strategic dilemma for Turkey, a NATO member, if it escalates its military involvement in the region. China has watched the US and NATO financial drain in Afghanistan – an estimated $4 trillion over two decades – and doubts Ankara can afford a similar quagmire in Syria. While Beijing stands to benefit from the fallout, it appears disinclined to intervene directly.
A calculated retreat
China’s cautious approach underscores its pragmatic assessment of Syria’s strategic value. The collapse of the Assad regime highlights the limits of external support in the face of deep-seated economic and social challenges. For Beijing, the opportunity cost of deeper involvement is simply too high. Syria’s unravelling, while tragic, confirms China’s cautious strategy in navigating complex geopolitical landscapes.